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Abstract
The determinants of change in trust have long been a matter of debate in the 
social capital literature. An area of particular interest for political scientists 
has been trust in state institutions because of the possible consequences 
it could have on democratic life. In an attempt to generalize results, most 
studies have focused on large cross-sectional samples. However, these 
studies overlook the context in which citizens and state institutions find 
themselves. The case study of Mexico presented in this paper attempts to 
contribute to the literature by emphasizing context over generalizability. 
The case of Mexican state institutions supports the hypothesis that events 
that taint an institution for not performing according to its prescribed 
function lead to sharp declines in trust. Consequently, structural reforms 
that ensure that institutions recur to their constitutive norm may help 
increase trust in state institutions. In addition, there is strong evidence 
indicating that GDP growth causes an increase in trust in state institutions. 
Therefore, democracies in developing countries may benefit when their 
economies are performing well.
Introduction
 My desire to write this thesis is perhaps best explained by a true 
story. A friend of mine has a house on a very secluded beach on the Mexican 
Pacific coast. He invited me to escape the Philadelphia winter and spend 
a week in the sun. This was March 2009. The son of the lady that works 
at the house came to pick us up at the airport. As we were riding in the 
truck our conversation naturally shifted towards the state of insecurity in the 
country – a very common occurrence in Mexican small-talk. Our driver said 
that things were very calm around his neighborhood because of the presence 
of drug lords. We inquired how this was so.  He said, “the cartel has put a 
new operative in place called Operación Limpieza (Operation Cleanup) that 
has made robbers and kidnappers stay out of my neighborhood. The capos 
want to make money by selling drugs in the streets. But who is going to go 
out and buy drugs when it is not safe to be on the streets. The cartel posted 
warnings and murdered anyone who robbed or kidnapped.” I wanted to ask 
more, but our driver immediately changed the subject. 
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 After this conversation, numerous questions started building 
up in my head. Have the narcos replaced public security institutions? Do 
some Mexicans trust the drug cartels more than the state? How has this 
affected other Mexican institutions? How has this affected the rule of law 
in the country? These fascinating questions were enough to keep me busy 
doing years of field research, perhaps enough to write a book. Given time 
and geographical constraints, I decided to search for available information 
on Mexican institutions. After months of searching, I came across a survey 
conducted by Consulta Mitofsky that measures trust in a variety of the 
county’s institutions. Unfortunately, the survey was conducted at a national 
level, impeding the possibility of comparing institutional trust among states 
with high vs. low cartel presence. Therefore, I chose to use this national data 
in order to reveal the factors that cause variations in trust in Mexican state 
institutions. The central question of this research paper is: what explains 
changes in trust in Mexican state institutions?
 Although different from the initial inquiries, this research question is 
equally ambitious. Firstly, it contributes to the literature on the determinants 
of institutional trust from an in-depth and context-based perspective, rather 
than through a cross-sectional and generalizable approach. The case of 
Mexico is particularly interesting because it is a developing country that has 
recently democratized. As such, the second ambitious characteristic of this 
research endeavor is that it sheds light on the importance of trust in state 
institutions for young democracies in developing countries. This is made 
possible by the implications of theories on the determinants of institutional 
trust from which the hypotheses tested in this paper are derived. Testing the 
direct effects of institutional trust on democracy would be too complicated of 
a task. Finally, answering this research question suggests means of action to 
improve young democracies and identifies economic scenarios that catalyze 
the further development of democratic society.
 The arguments defended by the case of Mexican state institutions are 
twofold. Firstly, events that taint an institution for not performing according 
to its prescribed function lead to sharp declines in trust. Consequently, 
structural reforms that ensure institutions recur to their constitutive norm 
may help increase trust in state institutions. Secondly, there is strong evidence 
indicating that GDP growth causes an increase in trust in state institutions. 
Therefore, democracies in developing countries may benefit when their 
economies perform well. In order to explain as clearly as possible how these 
arguments were reached, the paper is divided into six sections. The first 
section delves into the literature on trust, bringing in definitions of key terms, 
explaining the debate on the relation between democracy and trust, and 
developing three basic arguments derived from theories on the determinants 
of institutional trust. The second section presents three hypotheses derived 
from the literature and their respective causal mechanisms. The third section 
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clarifies the selected data and justifies the methodology used for testing the 
hypotheses. The fourth section describes the data results succinctly, while 
the fifth section analyzes these results. Finally, the sixth section concludes.
Literature Review
Trust in State Institutions and Democracies
 Trust can take a variety of forms. In the most general sense, “trust 
involves a judgment, however implicit, to accept vulnerability to the potential 
ill will of others by granting them discretionary power over some good. When 
one trusts, one accepts some amount of risk for potential harm in exchange 
for the benefits of cooperation” (Warren 1). Indeed, risk is a central aspect 
of trust and the outcome that is put at risk to others’ malfeasance is of some 
value to the person that is deciding whether to trust (Tilly 4). Nevertheless, 
cooperation increases by taking such risks, allowing social coordination 
problems to be resolved.  (Leslie 540). However, an important distinction is 
that trusting an individual is not the same as trusting an institution. Unlike 
institutions, individuals can reciprocate and interact in face-to-face relations. 
Consequently, it is somewhat harder to trust an institution – some even 
believe that it is impossible to do so (Hardin 35). This dispute on institutional 
trust, which will be thoroughly developed in the next section, is reflected in 
the views regarding the decline in political institutions within the United 
States and Western Europe over the past decades (Inglehart 4, 1997). The 
central question in this debate asks: is the decline of trust in state institutions 
favorable or unfavorable for democracies? 
 The debate on the relation between institutional trust and democracy 
remains unresolved. However, finding the factors that determine this 
type of trust sheds light on which stance to take on the debate. On one 
hand, the cry for democracy stems – at least in part – from a lack of trust 
in authorities. If people in Tunisia were willing to sacrifice their lives to 
overthrow the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally, it is clear that the trust 
relationship between the citizens and this party had severely deteriorated. 
Indeed, political legitimacy and trust in government are highly interrelated 
(Inglehart 104). Furthermore, even developed democracies impose checks 
and balances on state institutions, as if acknowledging that full trust in the 
system’s institutions is never warranted.  On the other hand, some argue that 
a prerequisite for democratization is the incorporation of trust networks by 
the government (Tilly 22). In other words, a democracy requires a society 
that trusts the government will commit – and is able – to fulfill its functions. 
Moreover, even fully democratized nations benefit from institutional trust. 
Given that political resources are scarce, warranted trust in particular 
institutions permits people in democracies to invest their resources more 
effectively – namely where trust is not warranted (Warren 4). Also, checks 
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and balances are not necessarily proof of the undesirability of institutional 
trust within democracies since their function is precisely that of facilitating 
trust in government institutions. This debate remains unresolved given the 
complications that arise when testing what institutions (if any) deserve trust 
conditional on the stage of democratization. Nonetheless, it is possible to test 
what factors cause changes in institutional trust. The arguments for these 
factors have theoretical bases that imply either a favorable or an unfavorable 
view of institutional trust for democracies.
 Because theories on the determinants of institutional trust have 
implications on the effect that trust in state institutions has on democracy, 
revealing these factors is important not only in itself, but also because it may 
justify the stance taken on the aforementioned debate. The following section 
clarifies existing theories found in the literature from which three arguments 
to construct hypotheses are derived. Moreover, the implications that these 
arguments have on the relation between democracy and trust in state 
institutions are clarified. The three arguments are divided into the following 
subsections: materialist, functional, and security. 
The Determinants of Institutional Trust
Materialist Argument 
 The materialist argument states that low trust in state institutions 
is not necessarily an unfavorable condition for a democracy. The theories 
that support this argument affirm that institutional trust is incredibly 
hard to justify. In its most extreme form, the theories rely on the notion of 
encapsulated trust, which denies the normative possibility of trusting an 
institution. But even theorists that believe that institutional trust is possible 
provide materialist arguments. Both explain the declining trust in state 
institutions as a result of people refining their conditions for trust. The 
cause for this refinement lies in increasing material well-being (hence the 
materialist argument). As such, a decline in trust in state institutions may 
imply that people are actually better off.
 Encapsulated trust, as explained by Russell Hardin, questions the 
normative possibility of trusting an institution. In Hardin’s model, trust is 
intelligible only when A trusts B to do (or in relation to) x. The variable x 
must be a definite action or purpose which A expects B to do because B has 
a reason to do so that is grounded in A (Hardin 26). As such, individuals can 
genuinely trust only when they have enough information that allows them to 
know the potential trusted actor’s motivations towards the trusting individual 
(Hardin 24). This means that there are specific cognitive conditions that need 
to be met in order for one to trust someone or something. Consequently, the 
complexity and opacity surrounding the interests of modern state institutions 
leads theorists advocating for encapsulated trust to conclude that it does 
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not make sense to trust institutions.1 For example, a citizen (A) should trust 
Congress (B) to include the public option in the healthcare bill (x) if and only 
if she has enough information to expect that the motivations of congressmen 
and congresswomen align with her preferences towards the public option. 
This type of trust is impossible on two grounds. On one hand, it is incredibly 
costly – if not impossible – to obtain such information. On the other hand, 
the nature of democratic systems hinders the possibility of high trust in state 
institutions because of the variety of preferences and motivations to which 
these institutions would have to align themselves. As a result, the theory of 
encapsulated trust deems trust in state institutions as nonsensical because 
the conditions for trust cannot be met.
 The literature points to material well-being as the causal factor that 
modifies people’s cognitive conditions regarding trust. In other words, 
citizens are refining their conditions for trusting others as their material 
well-being increases. Specifically, Ronald Inglehart argues that trust in 
government institutions decreases when people surpass a materialist stage 
and become Post-materialists (Inglehart 299, 1997). In other words, people’s 
conditions for trusting institutions become more sophisticated once their 
level of material well-being has an effect on their value-system.2 A Materialist 
emphasizes economic and physical security, while a Post-materialist 
emphasizes autonomy and self-expression (Inglehart 135, 2008). Although 
it is hard to determine when a country’s value-system changes, testing the 
effect that material well-being has on institutional trust may prove to be 
quite insightful. In particular, if the effect is negative, this would support the 
adoption of post-materialist values in a country. In terms of democracy, it is 
clear that post-materialist values, including autonomy and self-expression, 
would provide a healthier democratic society. However, increasing material 
well-being does not always change the value-system of a country since 
the latter is highly determined by culture. Nevertheless, since a decrease 
in institutional trust may suggest that post-materialist values are being 
internalized, such a fall could be seen favorably in some cases.
Functional Argument
 The functional argument claims that low trust in state institutions is 
an unfavorable condition for democracy. Unlike the notion of encapsulated 
trust, the theories that support this argument state that it makes sense for 
people to trust certain institutions. The conditions for institutional trust are 
made possible by the fact that the constitutive norm for which an institution 
stands is intelligible to the members of society. Moreover, these theories 
explain declining trust in state institutions as a result of the inability of 
these organizations to recur to their constitutive norm. Therefore, their 
performance in terms of their normative function is the determining factor 
for changes in institutional trust (hence the functional argument).3 As such, 
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a decline in trust in state institutions implies suboptimal performance of a 
democracy’s state institutions.  
 Whereas supporters of encapsulated trust claim that the conditions 
to trust state institutions can never be fulfilled, other theorists believe that 
institutions in general can be trusted. Claus Offe’s defense of institutional 
trust aims at explaining how people can trust institutions and discusses 
why citizens will trust some institutions and not others. Obtaining enough 
information on the preferences and intentions of an institution is not a 
necessary condition for institutional trust, but rather one must know the 
“repertoire of meaning and justification” that is produced by the institution 
in order to trust it (Offe 71). For example, people can trust their bank because 
the basic idea for which the institution stands is intelligible to them. The 
condition that determines whether the bank is trusted depends on whether 
the institution is structured in such a way that it complies with the idea for 
which it stands. As opposed to Hardin, Offe believes that institutions can be 
trusted when they merit such trust.4
 This defense of institutional trust assumes that institutional 
frameworks shape people’s behavior. In other words, if an institution 
is structured so as to recur to its “constitutive norms”, individuals have 
reason to expect that strangers within this institutional regime will express 
predictable patterns of behavior that concur with the meaning inherent to the 
institution (Warren 7). Unfortunately, members of society cannot determine 
whether an institution is properly structured. They can, however, observe the 
performance record of an institution. In the specific case of state institutions, 
individuals may be more aware of the institutions’ performance since it 
directly affects the lives of all citizens given their all-encompassing functions. 
As Charles Tilly argues, “integration of trust networks into public politics 
operates… incrementally in response to governmental performance” (Tilly 
22). Consequently, this functional argument implies that trust in institutions 
can be generated. The most obvious way of achieving this is to have a 
flawless record of maintaining the institution’s constitutive norm. Finally, 
the functional argument has a clear stance on the debate regarding the 
relation between trust in state institutions and democracy. Since a decrease 
in institutional trust suggests poor institutional performance, a democracy 
that is experiencing a decline in trust in state institutions is not functioning 
correctly.
Security Argument
 It is unclear whether the security argument claims that low trust 
in state institutions is an unfavorable condition for a democracy. This is 
because this argument is supported by theories on generalized trust rather 
than institutional trust. The theories presented here have both rational and 
psychological aspects. Nonetheless, the common determinant for declining 
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generalized trust is pessimistic economic outlooks from people in society. In 
other words, when people are afraid of their present and future economic 
prospects, they trust others less (hence the security argument). Moreover – as 
elaborated later on – the corrosion of generalized trust hinders the capacity 
of individuals to fight for common ends, crippling civil society and allowing 
corrupt government to arise (Warren 12). Therefore, the effect that declining 
trust in state institutions has on democracy will depend on whether this type 
of trust is included in or excluded from the broader notion of generalized 
trust.
 The definition of trust used in this paper emphasizes the fact that trust 
always involves the risk of being harmed by the agent trusted in exchange 
for obtaining the benefits of cooperation. Thus, the decision to trust (or not to 
trust) can be treated as a choice made under uncertainty for which a rational 
choice approach would be appropriate. Under this framework, people tend 
to be characterized as risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving. The rational 
security argument states that people who enjoy greater economic security 
tend to be more risk loving when it comes to trusting others, while those that 
lack this security are more risk averse (Inglehart 89). This difference stems 
from the fact that a person on shaky economic grounds cannot afford to take 
the risk of trusting a stranger because if the trusted agent defects on the actions 
that are expected of him, the trusting individual loses more relative to what 
an economically secure trusting individual would lose. This argument can 
also be seen from a psychological lens. Eric Uslaner argues that dispositions 
to optimism and pessimism, which are highly reflected in economic security, 
produce the differences in the willingness to trust strangers (Uslaner 139). 
Therefore, trust is not only determined by economic status, but also by the 
context in which trust decisions are made. In other words, even a rich person 
will be less likely to trust others when the future seems dire, such as during 
a global economic crisis.
 The security argument concerns a broader notion of trust than the 
arguments presented in the previous sections. The trust explained here 
applies not only to institutions, but to anything that would not be trusted 
because of informal links, including family or group ties.5 In other words, the 
security argument deals with trust conferred to things or people with whom 
the trusting individual has had no previously established relationships. This 
trust in strangers and distant institutions has been defined by the literature 
as generalized trust. On the other hand, trust in acquaintances and kin is 
considered particularized trust (Warren 9). The social capital literature is 
heavily invested in generalized trust because it enhances the capability of 
building social capital. According to Robert Putnam, social capital includes 
“features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” 
(Putnam 167).6 Since trust in strangers and distant institutions eases the 
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creation of networks that help solve coordination problems, generalized 
trust is a crucial factor in social capital. Whether trust in state institutions 
should be considered a part of generalized trust is a contentious issue that 
will be touched upon in the next section. 
 In short, the security argument states that generalized trust declines 
when the economic outlooks from people in society become more pessimistic. 
Given the positive view that the social capital literature has of generalized 
trust, a decline in this type of trust is unfavorable for a democracy. In other 
word, decreasing generalized trust entails a decrease in social capital, 
which can curtail economic efficiency and civic engagement. As such, 
the recommendations of this argument would include a stable economic 
environment and the provision of resources that would increase the people’s 
sense of economic security, including social safety nets. The following section 
discusses whether generalized trust encompasses trust in state institutions.
Generalized Trust and Trust in State Institutions
 The three arguments that have been presented to explain changes in 
institutional trust are summarized in the table below. These arguments are 
not exhaustive or mutually exclusive. 
Type of Trust Decrease in Trust in State 
Institutions
Recommendation for 
Democracy 
Materialist 
Argument
(Ronald Inglehart 
and Orlando 
Patterson)
Institutional trust Sometimes favorable 
since this may indicate 
that a country has 
internalized post-
materialist values
Improve the material 
well-being of people 
in society
Functional 
Argument
(Claus Offe and 
Jean Cohen)
Institutional trust Unfavorable since this 
indicates poor democratic 
performance
Improve institutions 
so that they recur 
to their constitutive 
norm
Security 
Argument
(Ronald Inglehart, 
Claus Offe, and 
Eric Uslaner)
Generalized trust Unfavorable if trust 
in state institutions is 
included in generalized 
trust
Uncertain if trust in state 
institutions is excluded 
from generalized trust
Provide a stable 
economic 
environment and 
resources that 
increase people’s 
sense of economic 
security (e.g. social 
safety nets)
 
 
 The question of including trust in state institutions as a part of 
generalized trust arises as a result of the lack of mutual exclusiveness in the 
arguments. Both Claus Offe and Ronald Inglehart – advocates of conflicting 
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views regarding trust in state institutions – are supporters of the security 
argument (Warren 11).7 They agree that the economic dispositions of optimism 
or pessimism play a role regarding generalized trust. Moreover, both 
concur that more generalized trust is a good thing for democratic societies. 
Given that Inglehart deems a decreasing generalized trust as unfavorable 
and a decreasing trust in state institutions as favorable in some cases, he is 
implicitly excluding institutional trust from the more encompassing notion 
of generalized trust. This suggests that his vision of a prosperous society 
entails a discriminating trust in political institutions coupled with strong 
generalized trust. On the other hand, Offe’s view regarding these two notions 
of trust does not generate any conflict. Thus, it can be implied that there is 
no need for any division and that generalized trust encompasses the notion 
of institutional trust. In this last case, a decline in trust in state institutions 
will always be regarded as unfavorable because it implies a decrease in 
generalized trust, which promotes the creation of social capital. The same 
judgment is unclear in the exclusionary case because theorist may still view 
trust in state institutions as positive for democracies on its own accord. 
 This inclusion vs. exclusion debate of trust in state institutions 
and generalized trust contains other mixed stances. Not all advocates of 
the materialist argument support exclusion and not all advocates of the 
functional argument support inclusion. For example, Jean Cohen supports 
the functional argument, but avoids including trust in state institutions as part 
of generalized trust. He argues that strong institutions are essential to social 
capital building (Cohen 222). Cohen believes that strong political and legal 
institutions provide the necessary conditions for creating social trust. Rather 
than generalized trust encompassing trust in state institutions, the latter is 
independent and promotes the former. On the other hand, the materialist 
argument postulated by Orlando Patterson argues for a causal mechanism 
linking socioeconomic status to both generalized trust and trust in political 
institutions. He suggests that greater affluence allows for a more reasonable 
perception of the effectiveness in politics, “which reinforces generalized 
trust, political trust, and the tendency to become more politically active” 
(Patterson 196). Therefore, this materialist argument views institutional trust 
as being in harmony with generalized trust.
 To summarize, the literature points to three arguments for explaining 
changes in trust. Two of these – the materialist and the functional argument 
– stand in direct contrast regarding trust in state institutions. The former 
maintains material well-being as the catalyst for change and views a decline 
in trust in state institutions as favorable for democracy in some cases. The 
latter focuses on the performance of institutions as the basis of change and 
regards a decline in trust in state institutions as unfavorable for democracy. 
The third is the security argument and it refers to generalized trust rather than 
institutional trust. The cause of change in this argument is the disposition to 
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economic optimism or pessimism in society. This argument provides no clear 
normative judgment on a decline in trust in state institutions. The inclusion 
of trust in state institutions in the notion of generalized trust implies that a 
decline would be unfavorable. This is because there is a broad consensus 
in the social capital literature that generalized trust is a crucial factor for 
building social capital. However, the exclusion of trust in state institutions 
does not necessarily imply a favorable view of a decline in this type of trust. 
Finally, these views on exclusion and inclusion are not divided according to 
materialist vs. functional lines. The following section postulates hypotheses 
that stem from these theories in order to test them in the specific case of 
Mexico. 
Hypotheses
 Based on the literature review, the following hypotheses for 
explaining changes in trust in Mexican state institutions arise:
 1.  Increasing indicators of material well-being lead to decreasing   
  trust in state institutions, and vice-versa
 2.  Events that mark the failure of state institutions to perform   
  according to their proper function lead to decreasing trust in   
  state institutions, and vice-versa.
 3.  Decreasing indicators of economic security lead to decreasing   
  trust in state institutions, and vice-versa.
 The first hypothesis stems from a naïve version of the materialist 
argument. The causal mechanism starts with an increase in material well-
being in Mexico, as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the 
Human Development Index (HDI). With this economic development taking 
place, the value-system in Mexico shifts gradually away from materialism and 
towards postmaterialism.8 Consequently, Mexicans internalize autonomy as 
a core value and thusly refine their conditions for trusting state institutions. 
Assuming the notion of encapsulated trust, Mexicans will realize that it is 
ridiculous to trust in something whose interests are opaque. Therefore, trust 
in state institutions declines as material well-being increases.
 From explaining the causal mechanism of this first hypothesis, it is 
possible to identify two weaknesses. Firstly, it is unclear whether an increase 
in GDP or HDI actually improves the material well-being of all Mexicans. 
This is even true for per capita measurements since most of the wealth 
may be concentrated in a small percentage of the population. Nonetheless, 
these two indicators continue to be the common proxies for economic 
development. Secondly, even assuming that the material well-being of 
everyone increases with GDP or HDI, it is not certain that Mexican citizens 
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become Post-materialists as a result (see footnote 8). This is especially the 
case of historically Catholic countries such as Mexico, where it is harder for 
values such as autonomy and self-expression to take hold (Inglehart 217, 
1997).9 Nevertheless, it is impossible to test for cultural variations and value-
system shifts when dealing with only one case. As such, the first hypothesis 
rests solely on the notion that people refine their conditions for trust as GDP 
increases – regardless of changes in values. Because values of autonomy and 
self-expression are not necessarily internalized, even if this hypothesis is 
proven correct, it is inconclusive in providing evidence for the argument that 
low levels of trust in state institutions are good for democracy.
 The second hypothesis is based on the functional argument. The 
causal mechanism starts with an event that proves to citizens that a Mexican 
state institution is not performing according to its prescribed function. Given 
that the state institution is not recurring to its constitutive norm, Mexican 
citizens would realize that the institution cannot be trusted. In other words, 
the fact that the institution defected from what it is supposed to do means 
that the institution is not structured so as to align the motivation and interests 
of its members with its goal. Since the structure of the institution is flawed, 
Mexican citizens will fear other future defections that may hurt them and 
will therefore not risk trusting the state institution. 
 This hypothesis implies that it is possible to improve trust in state 
institutions by undergoing structural reforms. However, the cause of 
the failure of an institution to recur to its constitutive norm is not always 
structural. There may be exogenous factors such as embedded corruption in 
society or chronic violence that may prevent the state institution from fulfilling 
its duty. Given that these factors are more common in developing countries 
that in developed countries, this hypothesis would imply that there is higher 
volatility of trust in the former. Either way, any action that may increase 
institutional trust would be recommended primarily because low levels of 
trust in state institutions are viewed unfavorably by the theories supporting 
this hypothesis. In other words, since improving the poor performance of 
state institutions is good for democracy, means of action such as enacting 
structural reforms, controlling embedded corruption, and fighting chronic 
violence would be recommended.   
 The third hypothesis reflects the ideas of the security argument – or 
the encompassing security argument to be more precise. This specification lies 
in the fact that the hypothesis works under the assumption that generalized 
trust encompasses trust in state institutions. The causal mechanism starts 
with a change towards a more negative attitude in society about economic 
security, which can be measured by indicators like the Consumer Confidence 
Index (CCI). This means that Mexican citizens become more risk averse 
when it comes to trusting strangers or distant institutions. More specifically, 
the Mexican people fear for their own economic prospects and therefore 
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avoid the risk of losing more by trusting a state institution. Finally, because 
this hypothesis assumes that trust in state institutions is encompassed by 
generalized trust, if this hypothesis is proven correct, it would imply that 
low levels of trust in state institutions are bad for democracy. This is mainly 
because social capital would decrease as a result. 
 To summarize, the three hypotheses are not precisely the same as 
those stated by the arguments derived in the literature. The first hypothesis is 
based on a naïve notion of the materialist argument and the third hypothesis 
assumes that trust in state institutions is included in the notion of generalized 
trust. These limitations stem primarily from issues related to the feasibility 
of testing unobservable factors. Nevertheless, the second hypothesis follows 
the functional argument quite closely. The following section explains the 
methodology carried out to test these three hypotheses. It also justifies the 
selection of certain data over others. Finally, the meaning and source of the 
data used are clarified in order to lay down the implications and limitations 
of the results obtained.
Methodology 
Institutional Trust Data
 The data on institutional trust comes from the nonpartisan, 
independent public opinion research center Consulta Mitofsky. The survey 
samples are representative of the Mexican population.10 These surveys were 
held sporadically from April 2004 up until November 2007, after which the 
survey was carried out on a monthly basis. The total amount of observations 
per institutions is 41, which is sufficient for observing trends in the data.
 The question regarding institutional trust asks: How much trust 
do you have in the following institution? After which a list of institutions is 
presented and the respondents are given the option to answer using a scale 
that ranges from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest). After this information is collected, 
the arithmetic mean for each month is provided as the resulting trust in the 
given institution. Consulta Mitofsky considers a ranking from 8 to 10 to be 
high, between 6 and 7.9 to be medium, and from 0 to 5.9 to be low. The use 
of this particular public opinion data stems from the fact that it is the only 
publicly available data on institutional trust in Mexico that spans over more 
than 4 years and includes a variety of the country’s institutions.  
 The institutions selected for this paper can be divided into three 
categories: state institutions, state-related institutions, and non-state 
institutions. The reason for selecting more than just state institutions is to 
evaluate whether there are differences between these categories that would 
make the case of state institutions more noteworthy. The state institutions 
selected are the President, Senators, Deputies,11 the Supreme Court, the 
Army, and the Police. State-related institutions include the Federal Electoral 
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Institute (IFE)12 and the Political Parties. Business and the Media constitute 
the last category. All the available data on trust in these institutions were 
inserted into the statistical analysis program EViews. This institutional trust 
dataset is the basis for testing the three hypotheses proposed in the previous 
section. 
First and Third Hypotheses: Regression Model
 The method for testing the first and third hypothesis was an OLS 
linear regression model. The reason for not including the second hypothesis 
in this analysis is because it is impossible to measure events that mark the 
proper or improper performance of institutions through time. On the other 
hand, the first and third hypotheses deal with measurable phenomena.
 Firstly, material-well being can be measured through GDP, HDI, and 
other indicators. This study uses GDP because it is the available indicator with 
the highest frequency (quarterly data). At most, the other indicators were 
available on a yearly basis. Such lack of data points would have weakened 
the analysis, given that the monthly institutional trust data only spans from 
April 2004 to January 2011 with many gaps in the first months. Secondly, 
perceptions of economic security can be measured through the Consumer 
Confidence Index (CCI).  The CCI is comprised of five partial indicators: two 
relate to the current and expected economic situation of the household, the 
other two attend the current and expected economic situation of the country, 
and the fifth reflects the willingness of people to buy durable goods at the 
present time. This indicator is estimated by the Mexican central bank (Banco 
de México) and the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI) 
based on the results of a national survey.13 Fortunately, the frequency of 
this data is monthly. The datasets ranging from April 2004 to January 2011 
for both GDP and CCI were inserted into EViews,14 and the following OLS 
regression was run for each institution (i):
 There is no issue with multicollinearity in this regression because 
CCI and GDP are not highly correlated. In fact, the correlation between 
these independent variables is -0.13, which is quite small and surprisingly 
negative.15 
 According to the first hypothesis (or the naïve materialist argument), 
the coefficient for GDP (ß1) should be negative and significant for trust in 
state institutions. This is because increasing material well-being is expected 
to refine the conditions for trusting institutions. On the other hand, the third 
hypothesis (or the encompassing security argument) expects the coefficient 
for CCI (ß2) to be positive and significant, given that a decrease in economic 
security makes people more risk averse in terms of trust. 
!"#$!!" = ! + !!!"#! + !!!!"! + !! 	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Second Hypothesis: Piecewise-Trend-Break
 The method for testing the second hypothesis is more complicated 
than a simple OLS linear regression. This method involves selecting a 
simplified model that best describes the data in order to view changes in 
trend. Changes in the trend for trust in institutions can then be coupled 
with events regarding the proper or improper performance of institutions’ 
respective functions. I call the method proposed here “piecewise-trend-
break.” 
 For selecting the most appropriate model, the trust data for each 
institution was analyzed as a whole. Linear and quadratic trend models were 
fitted onto every institution’s trust data. For reasons specific to the nature of 
the data, there was no evidence for the possibility of an exponential trend 
or for any seasonal or cyclical variations. Afterwards, the model with the 
lowest Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) was selected.16 If the trend that 
fits the data best revealed no change in the direction of trust (i.e. increasing 
vs. decreasing), no additional steps were taken. This is always the case with 
linear models, but only occasionally for quadratic models. If the data followed 
a quadratic trend that showed a change in the direction of trust, the data was 
broken into no more than two subsamples. In other words, when the fitted 
trends looked like an inverted U, the maximum was used as the point for 
dividing the data.  Finally, for those institutions where a separation of the 
sample was necessary, the first and the second step were repeated on each 
subsample until the entire sample data for each institution was modeled in a 
piecewise fashion. 
 This methodology was selected because it allowed for a reasonable, 
non-idiosyncratic way of analyzing changes in institutional trust. The inherent 
smooth curve of the quadratic model is appropriate for forecasting purposes 
since it takes into account the entire sample in a single model. However, 
the objective of this paper is to identify the determinants of changes in trust 
in state institutions, not to forecast their future levels. Therefore, it is more 
reasonable to identify places where the trend breaks. Curves cannot identify 
these ruptures, but lines can. On the other hand, it would not make sense 
to analyze every single change in trust that occurs from one observation to 
the next despite the fact that these are linear. Short-term variations are most 
likely random and are reflected in the non-zero variance of the sample. Most 
importantly, an attempt to explain these changes would require utilizing 
many historical idiosyncrasies. Such an idiosyncratic approach loses 
analytical power in a manner analogous to data mining: the model fits the 
noise instead of the signal. 
 In the end, the objective is to find those linear breaks that cause more 
than short-term change. In other words, the dates in which the signs of the 
coefficients in linear trends change indicate a variation in the medium-term 
trend in institutional trust. Admittedly, this methodology only accounts 
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for changes in the direction of the trend in institutional trust – increasing, 
decreasing, or plateau – and exclude changes in intensity. Nevertheless, this 
information is sufficient for shedding light on the plausibility of the second 
hypothesis (or the functional argument). According to this hypothesis, 
there must be a significant event at every trend break such that if the event 
demonstrates that the institution is not recurring to its constitutive norm, the 
trend becomes negative, and vice-versa. 
Data Description
Regression Model
 The coefficients, their respective significance levels, and the 
R-squared of the regression ran on each institution are summarized in the 
following table:
INSTITUTION
t
GDP
ß1
CCI
ß2
R-SQUARED
R2
STATE 
President 0.302724*** (+) -0.002437 0.221662 (22%)
Senators 0.455490*** (+) -0.008111* (–) 0.395194 (40%)
Deputies 0.573082*** (+) -0.003211 0.334416 (33%)
Supreme Court 0.465727*** (+) -0.014616*** (–) 0.625113 (63%)
Army 0.131636** (+) 0.001496 0.099076 (10%)
Police 0.424061*** (+) -0.003175 0.285021 (28%)
STATE-RELATED
Political Parties 0.109534 -0.008032* (–) 0.082288 (8%)
IFE 0.062633 0.003139* (+) 0.084488 (8%)
NON-STATE
Business 0.734690*** (+) -0.015732*** (–) 0.622258 (62%)
Media 0.324301*** (+) -0.005730** (–) 0.475550 (48%)
* = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance
 The coefficient for GDP is positive and highly significant for all state 
and non-state institutions. The GDP dataset is measured in trillions of pesos, 
which is approximately tens of billions of dollars. In Mexico, this data is in 
billones de pesos.17 Therefore, an increase of approximately ten billion dollars 
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in Mexican GDP leads to a 0.30 increase in trust in the President; 0.46 for 
Senators; 0.57 in Deputies; 0.47 in the Supreme Court; 0.13 in the Army; 0.42 
in the Police; 0.73 in Business; and 0.32 in the Media. In the case of state-
related institutions, the coefficients for trust in the Political Parties and the 
IFE were also positive but not significant.
 The results of the CCI are mixed. For non-state institutions, the 
coefficient for CCI is negative and highly significant. For state-related 
institutions, the coefficient is significant but positive in the case of the IFE 
and negative for Political Parties. For state institutions, the coefficient is 
negative for both Senators and the Supreme Court, but has high significance 
only in the latter. Lastly, the other state institutions have a non-significant, 
negative coefficient for CCI, except for the Army, whose coefficient is positive. 
Moreover, it is hard to conceptualize exactly what a one-point change in the 
CCI means in concrete terms since it is meant to give economists an idea of 
how confidence in the economy has changed relative to other times. 
 In order to put into context how much the CCI changes from safe 
times to unsafe times, it is helpful to look at the maximum and the minimum 
of the dataset. The maximum occurs in March 2006 with a value of 112.55, 
while the minimum takes place in October 2009 with a value of 76.95. 
Therefore, CCI drops approximately 35.6 points from the economically 
most secure to the economically least secure period in the sample, making 
a one-point drop equivalent to 2.8% of the change. Consequently, dividing 
the coefficients by 0.028 reveals the effect of CCI on institutional trust when 
drastic changes in the perceptions of economic security occur. In other words, 
when perceptions of economic security change from extremely positive to 
extremely negative, trust in the Senators increases by 0.29; in the Supreme 
Court by 0.52; in the Political Parties by 0.29; in Business by 0.56; and in the 
Media by 0.20. Finally, trust in the IFE decreases by 0.11 when such a drastic 
decrease in the perceptions of economic security takes place. 
 The R-squared indicates what percentage of the variance in the 
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. In other 
words, it reveals how much CCI and GDP explain trust in institution i. 
Normally, a good R-squared is above 80%. However, the dependent variable 
studied in this paper is not a typical economic variable. There are many non-
measurable factors that could affect institutional trust. Moreover, given that 
only two independent variables are included, it would be quite impressive if 
these explained at least a third of the variation in institutional trust. 
 The R-squared values of the regressions are quite consistent. Non-
state institutions hold high R-squared values, and so do three out of the six 
state institutions. The other three state institutions have decent R-squared 
values, while the state-related institutions score the lowest of all. The 
following table will help clarify the former:
  Volume 7 | Spring 2012           93
Lorenzo Felipe Lagos
High
R2  ≥ 0.33
Medium
0.33 > R2  ≥ 0.10
Low
R2  < 0.10
Supreme Court (63%)
Business (62%)
Media (48%)
Senators (40%)
Deputies (33%)
Police (28%)
President (22%)
Army (10%)
Political Parties (8%)
IFE (8%)
 It is unclear what other measurable independent variables exist that 
could contribute to institutional trust. Nevertheless, this is a powerful model 
because only two independent variables lead to relatively decent R-squared 
values in most of the cases. 
Piecewise-Trend-Break
 The graphs of the piecewise-trend-break method are located in 
Appendix E. All institutions begin with increasing linear or quadratic 
trends. Afterwards, the trust data stabilizes in a smaller range. This increase 
and stabilization in institutional trust is also clearly visible in the rough 
data graph on all institutions located in Appendix F. When these initially 
increasing trends end, there are three different options that may ensue: a 
drop followed by another increasing trend, a plateau, or a decreasing trend; 
a simple plateau; or a switch in trend. The defining characteristic of a drop is 
that the difference between the value previous to the break and the value that 
follows it is greater than 0.30. This helps to differentiate between the drop 
followed by a plateau and the simple plateau.   
 The months where the trend-breaks occur are coupled with relevant 
political events taking place on those same dates in order to see if a reputation 
problem may account for these changes. The summary of the results are 
stated concisely in the following table:
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Date Event Institution Change in Trust
May 06-Jun 06 Pre-election criticism: media 
criticized for biased election 
coverage
Media Drop: 7.65 to 7.17 
(0.48)
Jun 06-Aug 06 Election controversy: 
allegations of electoral fraud
IFE Drop: 7.54 to 7.10 
(0.44)
Aug 06-Sep06 Election controversy 
resolved: no total recount 
awarded, Calderón wins the 
presidency
Senators
Deputies
Political Parties
Drop: 6.26 to 5.52 
(0.74), 
Drop: 6.12 to 5.73 
(0.39), 
Drop: 6.35 to 5.74 
(0.61)
Feb 07-Mar07 Security problems: Army 
deployed in Northern 
states, corruption of Police 
emphasized
Army
Police
Trend: 0.02 to -0.01
(-0.03) 
Drop: 6.53 to 5.85 
(0.68)
Dec 08-Jan09 n/a Senators
Business
Media
Plateau: 6.04 
Plateau: 6.87
Plateau:7.55
Feb 09-Mar09 n/a Supreme Court Plateau: 6.94
Jul 09-Aug09 Elections: midterm elections 
results given
Political Parties Drop: 6.08 to 5.75 
(0.33)
Sep 09-Nov09 n/a President Plateau: 6.72
 
The relevant events corresponded only to times when trust in the institution 
dropped or the trend switched sign. The following section analyzes the data 
presented and delves into the details of the events in the table in order to 
evaluate how they could have affected institutional trust. 
Data Analysis
Developing Countries and the Materialist Argument
 The regressions provide convincing evidence against the first 
hypothesis. The precise opposite of the materialist argument’s prediction 
occurred: increasing material well-being increased trust in state institutions, 
and vice-versa. The most obvious explanation for the collapse of this 
first hypothesis is that it is based on a naïve version of the materialist 
argument. Inglehart would point to cultural factors as the reason why 
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economic development in Mexico may not necessarily lead to a change in 
the country’s value system and consequently refine people’s conditions for 
trust (see footnote 8). But upon closer inspection, there may be a quite simple 
explanation for these results.
 Despite being a member of the OECD, Mexico is still in many ways 
a developing country. As such, the starting point for material well-being is 
much lower than in developed countries. Assuming that the material well-
being of everyone increases with GDP, a national government’s successful 
economic strategy would imply that the majority of people escape poverty. 
In this case, people may still rely heavily on the government for maintaining 
their newly achieved economic status. Consequently, their conditions for 
trusting institutions are not refined and people become more confident in 
the institutions they view as responsible for their material improvements. 
Moreover, the people would be thankful to the government and trust it for 
bringing them out of such dire conditions. However, this may not be the 
case in developed countries, where the majority of the population would 
move up from the middle class as material well-being increases. Indeed, the 
analysis presented here only contains evidence for the case of developing 
countries. Therefore – in developing countries such as Mexico – increasing 
indicators of material well-being lead to increasing trust in state institutions, 
and vice-versa. A closer look at the results from the regressions provides 
stronger support for this refined version of the first hypothesis.
 All state institutions and non-state institutions have positive and 
significant coefficients for GDP, while state-related institutions only lack the 
significance. This evidence suggests that the state-related institutions included 
in the analysis are not viewed by Mexican citizens as being important factors 
in changing material well-being. The IFE organizes elections and the Political 
Parties participate in them. As the economic conditions of the country 
improve, it is unlikely that Mexicans will rely more on the IFE or the Political 
Parties. Even though political actors that enact economic change come from 
some party line and their electoral victories are decided by the IFE, these 
state-related institutions are not viewed by citizens as key economic players. 
On the other hand, the non-state institutions included in the analysis clearly 
contribute to GDP growth. Business is an obvious contributor to the economic 
prosperity of the country. It is the only institution that is significantly 
correlated to GDP data (0.70) and its coefficient for GDP is the largest out 
of all the institutions (0.73). Also, the Media in Mexico is dominated by 
big business. This is particularly clear in television, where two companies, 
Televisa and TV Azteca, control almost 100% of the Mexican TV broadcasting 
market. The owners of these media networks, Emilio Azcárraga and Ricardo 
Salinas Pliego respectively, are powerful members of the Mexican business 
community. Another piece of evidence that suggests the tight relationship 
between business and the Mexican media is that the correlation in trust 
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between these two institutions is remarkably high and positive (0.87).  
 If the public’s view of an institution as a contributor to economic 
prosperity determines whether their institutional trust positively depends on 
GDP, certain doubts exists regarding the results for some state institutions. 
While the President, the Senators, and the Deputies enact reforms to improve 
the country’s economy, the Supreme Court, the Army, and the Police do not 
directly contribute to the economy. The first deals with judicial matters, 
while the last two focus on security issues. The only defense for these 
results is that reliance on all state institutions increases as the country is 
developing. A more prosperous country requires a solid judicial system and 
a safe environment. Thus, when material well-being increases in developing 
countries, people confer more trust upon those institutions that will further 
this development. As for the case of the IFE and the Political Parties, it is 
unclear whether prosperity is directly linked to electoral matters. Therefore, 
one of two conditions must be satisfied in order for an institution’s trust 
to increase as material well-being increases in a developing country: 1) the 
institution is a state institution; or 2) the public views this institution as a 
main contributor to economic prosperity. 
Economic Security
 The regressions also provide evidence against the third hypothesis: 
decreasing indicators of economic security lead to decreasing trust in none of 
the state institutions. The coefficient for CCI was only positive for the Army, 
but it was not significant. In all the other state institutions, the coefficient was 
negative and only significant for the Senators and the Supreme Court. Thus, 
trust in these two institutions decreases as perceptions of economic security 
increase. This is suggestive evidence against the assertion that people 
become more risk averse in trusting a state institution as their economic 
safety weakens. Moreover, these mixed results might be a reflection of the 
fact that this hypothesis is based on the encompassing security argument. In 
other words, the third hypothesis is derived from an argument that assumes 
trust in state institutions is included in generalized trust. Given that the 
coefficients for all state institutions were not the same sign may indicate that 
trust in state institutions is not necessarily a category that is encompassed by 
generalized trust. Instead, each state institution may have its own merits for 
being included or excluded from this broader category. A closer analysis of 
the results from all the regressions provides further insights to the previous 
arguments.  
 All the state-related and non-state institutions have significant 
coefficients for CCI and all of them are negative, except for trust in the 
IFE which is positive and significant. Indeed, the case of the IFE is special, 
probably because of its autonomy. It is the only institution whose trust is 
not significantly correlated to that of any other institution. Trust in the IFE is 
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also small when extreme changes in economic security perception take place 
(0.11).  On the other hand, trust in Business attains the greatest effect (0.56), 
while the Supreme Court follows closely in second (0.52). This may seem 
counterintuitive: why would a person whose economic safety is at stake trust 
Business, the Media, Political Parties, and the Supreme Court more, but at 
the same time trust the IFE less? 
 There are two possible answers to this question. The first possible 
answer is that people who fear they might lose everything will want to gain 
protection from some state institutions and political parties, secure jobs 
from non-state institutions, and ensure favorable results in elections. For 
example, a person will confer more trust to Business and the Media when the 
economic future is uncertain because these are primary actors in ensuring 
that jobs in the economy are created. Moreover, trust in Political Parties, 
the Supreme Court, and the Senators also increases as this person seeks 
political protection. Finally, this person also holds certain beliefs about how 
his favorable economic situation could be maintained, and therefore will not 
trust the IFE in fear that the will of the people does not coincide with his/
her preferences. Nevertheless, this explanation is quite a stretch and there is 
not enough evidence to support it. It does not explain why the coefficients 
of trust in other state institutions are not significant. Moreover, it contradicts 
the previous section’s explanation that maintained that the IFE and Political 
Parties are not linked to economic prosperity. The second possible answer 
to these results pertains to the inclusion vs. exclusion debate between trust 
in state institutions and generalized trust. Since the IFE organizes elections, 
it supports relationships among people as democratic citizens. As such, the 
IFE is an institution that creates trust among strangers, which is precisely 
the definition of generalized trust. Given that the original security argument 
addresses generalized trust, it is reasonable for the regression on trust in the 
IFE to support this argument. Nonetheless, this second explanation does not 
clarify why trust in Business, the Media, Political Parties, and the Supreme 
Court have negative coefficients for CCI. In the end, although it is certain 
that the evidence presented here does not support the encompassing security 
argument, the results are too mixed to ascertain which other argument they 
would support. 
 The previous analysis may cast doubts on the validity of the 
regressions as a whole. Yet while the regressions have their limitations, they 
still maintain strong explanatory power. One clear limitation is that the data 
spans around 7 years, making it impossible to make long-term analyses. 
Even though this might have affected the results regarding CCI, the fact 
that the results for GDP are remarkably consistent strengthens the support 
for the refined version of the first hypothesis. Furthermore, the R-squared 
values of the regressions are not ideal, meaning that many other factors 
affect institutional trust. Nonetheless, none of the state institutions fall under 
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the “low R2 ” category. Indeed, those in the middle category are the state 
institutions in charge of security issues and the President – institutions with 
high political visibility whose trust is consequently affected by more factors 
than GDP and CCI. The converse argument applies to the Supreme Court. 
Given its low political visibility, fewer factors affect the trust that society 
confers upon this state institution, leading to the highest R-squared value 
when only GDP and CCI are included in the regression. Finally, even though 
the regression analysis has not illustrated all the factors that affect trust in 
state institution, the evidence sheds light on the validity of two possible 
determinants of institutional trust found in the literature. Therefore, the case 
study of Mexico supports the idea that increases in material well-being lead 
to increases in trust in state institutions and that changes in perceptions of 
economic security have mixed results. 
Democratization and Reputation
 The general graph of institutional trust in Mexico shows that trust 
increases considerably from April 2004 until around mid-2006, where the 
values stabilize within a small range.18 A possible reason for seeing such 
trends in trust in state institutions may be due to Mexico’s democratizing 
process. After almost 70 years of single-party rule by the Revolutionary 
Institutional Party (PRI), Vicente Fox from the opposing National Action 
Party (PAN) was elected president in 2000. The democratic transition was 
gradual and built up from the local level: it moved from municipalities to 
states, to the chambers of Congress, and finally to the presidency (De Remes 
177).  Fox’s election may have caused Mexican citizens to begin to trust these 
state institutions more. The promise of political inclusion of every citizen 
and accountability by the government might well account for the increasing 
trend. However, this is simply speculation, especially since there is no point 
of comparison given that trust in state-related and non-state institutions also 
experienced the same increase during this period. Moreover, it is unclear 
what caused the stabilization of trust within a small range somewhere around 
mid-2006. On one hand, some may argue that Mexico’s democratization 
took a step backwards in the 2006 presidential elections. After an extremely 
tight race, Felipe Calderón from the right-leaning PAN beat Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador from the left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(PRD) with 35.89% of the popular vote against 35.33%. Mr. Obrador and 
his followers demanded a total recount and laid claims of electoral fraud. 
Although this matter is still murky, those who believe that fraud occurred 
have good reason to stop trusting state institutions. On the other hand, trust 
in state institutions cannot increase forever. It is only logical that the initially 
increasing trends stabilized after some time. This view is further supported 
by the fact that state-related and non-state institutions also stabilized within 
a smaller range around the same period.
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 The piecewise-trend-break method provides clearer insight into 
specific political events and how these changed trust in state institutions. 
Most importantly, it provides strong evidence for the second hypothesis: 
events that mark the failure of state institutions to perform according to their 
proper function lead to decreasing trust in state institutions, and vice-versa. 
Moreover, the evidence presented by the piecewise-trend-break method also 
supports this functional argument with regards to all institutions studied in 
this paper – not just state institutions. In other words, when an institution 
does not recur to its constitutive norm, people stop trusting it in the short-
term.  
 The events surrounding the July 2, 2006 presidential elections 
caused decreases in trust in several institutions. In that year, trust in the 
Media dropped 0.48 points from May to June, trust in the IFE dropped 0.44 
points from June to July, and trust in the Senators, the Deputies, and Political 
Parties dropped 0.74, 0.39, and 0.61 respectively from August to September. 
Firstly, the Mexican media was heavily criticized for the amount of airtime 
it gave Mr. Calderón as opposed to Mr. Obrador. An important aspect of 
a trustworthy democratic system is the fair dissemination of information. 
When it became clear to many that the Media was not fulfilling its democratic 
responsibility, its trust fell considerably. Secondly, the IFE became the center 
of attention regarding the possibility of electoral fraud and the demand for 
a total recount of the votes. Given that the credibility of the IFE was put 
in doubt and that its reputation was tainted through these events, Mexican 
citizens reacted by trusting it less. Finally, the political actors that were 
on the ground discussing and fighting for the resolution of this electoral 
controversy were the Senators, the Deputies, and the Political Parties. Once 
it was decided in August that no total recount would be awarded, those 
who were dissatisfied with the resolution stopped conferring trust to the 
institutions they depended on. Therefore, when institutions do not do as 
expected, they suffer the consequences. 
 That data also shows that Political Parties suffer a similar fate after 
every election. The piecewise-trend-break method reveals a 0.33 point drop 
in trust in the Political Parties right after the July 2009 midterm elections 
as well. In fact, trust in this state-related institution peaks as election time 
approaches, but suffers from sharp decreases right after the electoral results 
are announced. This evidence may support the converse of the second 
hypothesis: as an institution performs according to its proper function, 
people trust it more. According to this functional argument, these electoral 
peaks occur because parties are reaching their base and building their 
constituencies as they campaign. This link between the people and their 
representatives tends to disappear once elections are over, especially in young 
democracies. Therefore, as long as institutions perform their appropriate 
function, their institutional trust increases. Another possible explanation for 
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these peaks may be attributed to the visibility that Political Parties obtain 
during electoral periods. However, this explanation is weakened by the 
fact that other institutions that receive significant media attention during 
elections, including the IFE, do not have these peaks.
 The fight against international organized crime has also taken its toll 
in terms of institutional trust. The slope for trust in the Army decreased by 
-0.03, while trust in the Police dropped 0.68 points from February to March 
2007. The Army has been one of the most trusted institutions in Mexico.19 
However, its primary function in public life was to provide aid during 
natural catastrophes. After President Calderón decided to take on the drug 
cartels, the Army was deployed in several states – starting with Michoacán in 
December 2006 – because the municipal and state police forces were deemed 
too corrupt to combat the drug cartels effectively. The amount of political 
capital the President invested in the Army is reflected in the fact that the trust 
in the Army data is significantly correlated to that of the President (0.74). After 
the initial deployment, more Army troops have been deployed and the police 
forces have been reformed. Both institutions suffered for different reasons. 
On one hand, the Police were already corrupt. However, it became evident 
that it could not perform its function as violence escalated. This indicates 
that there actually has to be a visible problem that affects public life, rather 
than just a hidden structural issue, in order to see a decrease in institutional 
trust. On the other hand, the Army faced the problem of a change in function. 
Given the violent response of the drug cartels and the difficulty in adapting 
to the duty of ensuring public security, the trend in the Army’s institutional 
trust became negative. This suggests that the problem of recurring to one’s 
constitutive norm is not only an issue of structure and performance, but also 
a political issue since this norm can be altered by the whims of the executive 
and legislative powers.
 The evidence presented by the piecewise-trend-break method 
certainly has its limits. Firstly, explanations for drops in institutional trust 
are the only ones taken into account. Only the speculative argument for 
democratic consolidation and the case of trust in Political Parties provide 
evidence regarding increases in trust as institutions recur to their respective 
constitutive norms. Secondly, the piecewise-trend-break method does not 
account for non-events. There may be other important political events that 
were ignored simply because they did not fall around the dates where breaks 
in the trend occurred. Finally, the analysis only explains short-term changes 
in institutional trust. In other words, the insights brought by the functional 
argument may lose significance with a database that covers a longer period 
of time. However, the analysis still holds value despite these limitations. 
Firstly, negative events have a sharper and more defining moment for 
institutional trust than do positive events. Secondly, the short-term nature 
of these explanations reveals that human beings may also have a short-term 
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memory in terms of institutional reputation. The case of trust in Political 
Parties provides the best example for this. Finally, these explanations also 
allow for the possibility of improvement through policy. By changing the 
structure of an institution and fighting corruption, it is more likely that an 
institution can recur to its constitutive norm. However, as the case of the 
Army suggests, politicians must be careful when they seek to alter the norm 
to which an institution has to recur.
Conclusion
 The arguments defended by the case of Mexican state institutions are 
twofold. Firstly, events that taint an institution for not performing according 
to its prescribed function lead to sharp declines in trust. The evidence for 
this argument is provided by the piecewise-trend-break method, which 
reveals that all the dates when institutions experienced a drop in trust 
match political events that mark the failure of the institution to recur to its 
constitutive norm. Consequently, structural reforms that ensure institutions 
recur to their constitutive norm may help increase trust in state institutions. 
Nevertheless, embedded corruption and chronic violence make it harder 
for some institutions to perform properly even if appropriately structured. 
Furthermore, it is more probable for trust in an institution to breakdown if 
constitutive norms change. This may not be a common occurrence, but the 
example of the Mexican Army shows that certain institutions can experience 
a shift with respect to their function. Moreover, this decline is more probable 
when the capability of an institution to perform such a function is limited. 
Therefore, resources that enhance capabilities are equally relevant to 
institutional trust. All in all, when an institution does not perform as expected 
and the public experiences the negative effects of this poor performance, 
institutions suffer the consequences in terms of the trust.
 The second argument supported by the case of Mexico is that GDP 
growth causes an increase in trust in state institutions, and vice-versa. The 
evidence for this argument is provided by the regression analysis, which 
reveals that the coefficient for GDP in all the state institution regressions 
is positive and highly significant. Therefore, trust in state institutions is 
not all about the institutions themselves; the economy plays an important 
role as well. The analysis of the results suggested that the positive effect of 
GDP growth on institutional trust may only apply to developing countries 
because the majority of people would be escaping poverty and consequently 
relying more on the government. It would be interesting to conduct a similar 
study that focuses on a developed country, in order to take into account the 
differences between moving up from the middle class and escaping poverty. 
As opposed to the first argument defended by the case study of Mexico, this 
second argument does not apply to all institutions. Only state institutions 
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and institutions that the public regards as main contributors to economic 
prosperity experience such an effect. Trust in Political Parties and the IFE was 
not significantly affected by changes in GDP. Finally, the regression analysis 
revealed mixed results in terms of the effects of economic security concerns 
on trust in state institutions. These results do not indicate that the security 
argument for generalized trust should be rejected. Instead, the results 
suggest that there should be more research focused on determining which 
specific institutional trust should be included as a part of generalized trust. 
The analysis in this paper provided some evidence for the IFE because of the 
relationships it facilitates between strangers as democratic citizens. Perhaps 
a cross-sectional study that pairs up institutions with similar supporting 
functions would shed more light on this issue.
 The arguments supported by this study also have important 
implications for the debate on democracy and trust in state institutions. In 
general, it seems that trust in state institutions is vital for young democracies 
such as Mexico. On one hand, this study provided supporting evidence for 
the functional argument, which views decreasing trust in state institutions 
unfavorably since this would imply that democratic institutions are not 
functioning properly. On the other hand, the case of Mexico also provides 
strong evidence against the materialist argument, which views decreasing 
trust in state institutions favorably because this would imply that people 
have internalized post-materialist values. Instead, GDP growth leads to 
increases in trust in state institutions. Therefore, democracies in developing 
countries may benefit when their economies perform well. 
 Reflecting back on the story about the driver and Operation Cleanup, 
it is clear that this paper only answers some of my initial questions. For 
example, if the state institution that is meant to provide public security fails to 
do so, trust in that institution will decrease. Consequently, it is worrying that 
the trend for trust in the Army has become slightly negative. Nevertheless, 
it remains unclear whether illegal organizations – such as the drug cartels 
– that perform these function, have gained trust from the population. I find 
this research topic fascinating, but it requires trust data measured at the local 
level and years of field research. Fortunately, the arguments defended by 
the case of Mexican state institutions provide further motivation for these 
ambitious research endeavors. Most importantly, the arguments indicate the 
importance of seeking high trust in state institutions and suggest the means 
to do so.   
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Appendix A: Institutional Trust Survey Sample Selection
Mexicans over 18 years of age that possess a voting card comprise the survey’s 
population. Three samples are taken every year and the survey is repeated for 
these samples every three months until the year ends. The sample selection 
consists of choosing fifty out of the more than 5,000 municipalities in the 
country at random. The probability of choosing a municipality is proportional 
to that of its population size. For each municipality, two electoral districts are 
chosen at random. Within this district, two random blocks are chosen. And 
from each block, five random households are selected. Only one member of 
each household is interviewed using a previously designed questionnaire. 
The sample size is 1,000 in all the months that this survey has been carried 
out.
TÉCNICA DE RECOLECCIÓN DE DATOS
El estudio fue llevado a cabo en viviendas particulares a través de entrevistas 
“cara a cara”utilizando como herramienta de recolección de datos un cuestionario, 
previamente estructurado mismo que es aplicado por personal calificado para esa 
labor (el cuestionario no es de autollenado).
MÉTODO DE ESTIMACIÓN DE LOS RESULTADOS
Los resultados presentados no son frecuencias simples, sino estimaciones basadas en 
la utilización de factores de expansión, calculados como el inverso de la probabilidad 
de selección de cada individuo en la muestra y corrección por no-respuesta en cada 
sección seleccionada en muestra.
 
ERROR MÁXIMO Y CONFIANZA DE LAS PREGUNTAS ELECTORALES
Aunque cada porcentaje tiene su propio error asociado, el diseño de muestra 
garantiza que en las estimaciones nacionales al menos 95 de cada 100 veces, el error 
no sobrepasa el ±3.1 por ciento. En los estudios de opinión pública, además del error 
muestral, se debe considerar que pueden existir otros errores ocasionados por el fraseo 
de las preguntas y las incidencias en el trabajo de campo.
Source: http://consulta.mx/ 
Appendix B: Consumer Confidence Index
La Encuesta Nacional sobre la Confianza del Consumidor (ENCO) se lleva a cabo 
durante los primeros veinte días de cada mes y tiene como base una muestra de 
2,336 viviendas urbanas a nivel nacional, en las que se entrevista personalmente al 
informante, para el cual se requiere que al menos tenga 18 años de edad. La ENCO se 
recaba en 32 ciudades que comprenden a la totalidad de las entidades federativas del 
país y el Nivel de Confianza de sus resultados es de 90% con un error máximo esperado 
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del 15 por ciento. La información captada permite estimar el Índice de Confianza del 
Consumidor, el cual está constituido tanto por la opinión que el entrevistado tiene 
del presente (comparado con algún punto de referencia en el pasado) como por su 
opinión de la situación futura (comparada con la presente).
 
Este es un índice con base igual a 100 en enero de 2003, que resulta de promediar 
cinco indicadores parciales de los cuales dos hacen referencia a la situación económica 
actual y esperada del hogar entrevistado, otros dos atienden a la situación económica 
actual y esperada del país y el quinto índice refleja qué tan propicio consideran el 
momento actual para la compra de bienes de consumo duradero. De esta manera, 
cada uno de los indicadores parciales que integran el Índice de Confianza del 
Consumidor resulta del promedio ponderado de los resultados expandidos de las 
respuestas a cada una de las siguientes preguntas: 
a) Comparada con la situación económica que los miembros de este hogar tenían hace 12 
meses ¿cómo cree que es su situación en este momento? 
b) ¿Cómo considera usted que será la situación económica de los miembros de este hogar 
dentro de 12 meses respecto a la actual? 
c) ¿Cómo considera usted la situación económica del país hoy en día comparada con la 
de hace 12 meses? 
d) ¿Cómo considera usted que será la condición económica del país dentro de 12 meses 
respecto de la actual situación? 
e) Comparando la situación económica actual con la de hace un año ¿cómo considera 
en el momento actual las posibilidades de que usted o alguno de los integrantes de 
este hogar realice compras tales como muebles, televisor, lavadora, otros aparatos 
electrodomésticos, etcétera?
En cada una de las cuatro primeras preguntas los entrevistados tienen cinco opciones 
de respuesta: mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor y mucho peor. En la quinta pregunta 
las opciones son: mayores, iguales y menores. Los ponderadores utilizados para cada 
opción de respuesta son los siguientes:
 
Opción de respuesta Ponderador 
Mucho mejor o mayores 1.00 
Mejor 0.75 
Igual 0.50 
Peor 0.25 
Mucho peor o menores 0.00
 
Es importante destacar que la gran mayoría de las series económicas se ven afectadas 
por factores estacionales. Éstos son efectos periódicos que se repiten cada año y cuyas 
causas pueden considerarse ajenas a la naturaleza económica de las series, como 
son las festividades, el hecho de que algunos meses tienen más días que otros, los 
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periodos de vacaciones escolares, el efecto del clima en las diferentes estaciones del 
año, y otras fluctuaciones estacionales como, por ejemplo, la elevada producción de 
juguetes en los meses previos a la Navidad provocada por la expectativa de mayores 
ventas en diciembre.
 
En este sentido, la desestacionalización o ajuste estacional de series económicas 
consiste en remover estas influencias intra-anuales periódicas, debido a que su 
presencia dificulta diagnosticar o describir el comportamiento de una serie económica 
al no poder comparar adecuadamente un determinado mes con el inmediato anterior. 
Analizar la serie desestacionalizada ayuda a realizar un mejor diagnóstico y pronóstico 
de la evolución de la misma, ya que facilita la identificación de la posible dirección 
de los movimientos que pudiera tener la variable en cuestión, en el corto plazo. Cabe 
señalar que la serie desestacionalizada del Índice de Confianza del Consumidor se 
calcula de manera independiente a la de sus componentes.
Source: www.banxico.org.mx/ 
Appendix C: Independent Variables in Regression Mod
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Appendix D: Correlations
PRESIDENT SENATORS DEPUTIES SUPRCOURT ARMY POLICE
PRESIDENT  1.000000  0.813808  0.854844  0.747192  0.737515  0.815137
SENATORS  0.813808  1.000000  0.961632  0.899694  0.406340  0.841706
DEPUTIES  0.854844  0.961632  1.000000  0.839641  0.509069  0.852708
SUPRCOURT  0.747192  0.899694  0.839641  1.000000  0.427503  0.790066
ARMY  0.737515  0.406340  0.509069  0.427503  1.000000  0.594069
POLICE  0.815137  0.841706  0.852708  0.790066  0.594069  1.000000
PARTIES  0.702211  0.845271  0.834255  0.666906  0.336935  0.788376
IFE  0.569866  0.327124  0.356830  0.222216  0.560564  0.343427
BUSINESS  0.731807  0.911222  0.890104  0.909123  0.303362  0.718524
MEDIA  0.799359  0.813653  0.796111  0.808729  0.466112  0.712308
GDP  0.457236  0.568730  0.559691  0.648416  0.361946  0.515214
CCI -0.155009 -0.324289 -0.169342 -0.529955  0.217405 -0.175230
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PARTIES IFE BUSINESS MEDIA GDP CCI
PRESIDENT  0.702211  0.569866  0.731807  0.799359  0.457236 -0.155009
SENATORS  0.845271  0.327124  0.911222  0.813653  0.568730 -0.324289
DEPUTIES  0.834255  0.356830  0.890104  0.796111  0.559691 -0.169342
SUPRCOURT  0.666906  0.222216  0.909123  0.808729  0.648416 -0.529955
ARMY  0.336935  0.560564  0.303362  0.466112  0.361946  0.217405
POLICE  0.788376  0.343427  0.718524  0.712308  0.515214 -0.175230
PARTIES  1.000000  0.452203  0.657464  0.639471  0.335715 -0.133867
IFE  0.452203  1.000000  0.176429  0.481517  0.096089  0.256614
BUSINESS  0.657464  0.176429  1.000000  0.866916  0.703746 -0.437738
MEDIA  0.639471  0.481517  0.866916  1.000000  0.637440 -0.339508
GDP  0.335715  0.096089  0.703746  0.637440  1.000000 -0.126358
CCI -0.133867  0.256614 -0.437738 -0.339508 -0.126358  1.000000
Correlations above 0.7 are marked in bold
Appendix E: Fitted Piecewise Trends
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Appendix G: Rankings
Ranking April 2006 January 2011 Percentage Change
1st Army
7.5
Army
7.7
Deputies
35.7
2nd Media
7
Media
7.6
Business
30.2
3rd IFE
6.7
IFE and Supreme Court
7
Senators
27.7
4th President
6.1
Business
6.9
Supreme Court
22.8
5th Supreme Court
5.7
President
6.8
Political Parties
21.3
6th Business
5.3
Senators
6
Police
16
7th Police
5
Police
5.8
President
11.5
8th Political Parties and 
Senators
4.7
Political Parties and 
Deputies
5.7
Media
8.6
9th Deputies
4.2
IFE
4.5
10th Army
2.7
Endnotes
1 The encapsulated trust model does not deny that people trust    
 institutions; it only states that this should not occur.
2 Unlike Hardin, Inglehart does believe that it is intelligible to trust an   
 institution.
  
3 The term functional is used instead of functionalist in order to avoid   
 confusion with structural functionalism
4 Notice that Offe’s argument explains when things are trusted, while   
 Hardin’s argument focuses on when they should be trusted. The   
 non-normativity of the defense of institutional trust implies that   
 the argument is easier to falsify with data. 
5 Informal links refer to those ties where previous relationships    
 have already been established, while formal links are those formed among  
 agents that have had no previous relationship. For an institutionalist   
 explanation of how these links are supported see Nichols 1999. 
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6 Putnam further draws the distinction between bonding trust (among kin)  
 and binding trust (among people from different groups). See Putnam 2000.
7 Offe and Inglehart have conflicting rather that opposing views since   
 Inglehart also believes that performance has an effect on institutional trust.  
 “It seems inconceivable that governmental performance would not   
 influence public opinion” (Inglehart, 294, 1997). Nevertheless, the   
 stark differences between the materialist and the functional argument   
 elaborated here remain valid.
8 This is certainly a naïve statement because economic development does not  
 always produce changes in culture and social structure (Inglehart, 117).
9 This may be changing in Mexico since the democratic transition in 2000.
10 See Appendix A for more information on the sample selection
11 Deputies in Mexico are analogous to Representatives in the US; both   
 comprise the Lower Chamber of Congress
12 The Instituto Federal Electoral is the autonomous institute that organizes  
 federal elections in Mexico 
13 See Appendix B for more information on how the CCI is estimated
14 From observing the graphs located in the Appendix C, it is interesting to  
 note how CCI begins to drop before the 2007-2008 global economic crisis  
 hits.
  
15 See Appendix D for the table on correlations
16 The SIC is used to select the model that best explains the data by applying  
 a heavy penalty for degrees of freedom
17 The equivalent of trillion in English is billón in Spanish, while a billion in  
 English is mil millones in Spanish
18 See Appendix F
19 See rankings in Appendix G
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